Operation Watts: Investigation into allegations of misuse of electorate office and ministerial office staff and resources for branch stacking and other party-related activities
- Recommendations
- 21
- Published responses
- 1
- Report length
- 236 pages
Summary
The report's own summary: Foreword, pages 6 to 8
Generated summary: written by an AI model from the report text and checked against the cited pages.
IBAC and the Victorian Ombudsman jointly investigated allegations that publicly funded staff and resources were used for ALP factional activity, including branch stacking.
The investigation focused on the Moderate Labor faction and examined staff deployment, employment practices and grants to associated community organisations.
Operation_Watts_Special_Report_FINAL_XbLt4JnB, page 146 · Operation_Watts_Special_Report_FINAL_XbLt4JnB, page 166
The two bodies found that staff were extensively diverted to factional work during paid hours and that two MPs breached conduct codes.
Operation_Watts_Special_Report_FINAL_XbLt4JnB, page 7 · Operation_Watts_Special_Report_FINAL_XbLt4JnB, page 147
The bodies could not quantify the misuse and said difficulties of proof prevented them from recommending prosecution.
The bodies made 21 reform recommendations, including an ethics committee, an independent parliamentary integrity commissioner, tighter staff-employment rules and stronger grant oversight.
Operation_Watts_Special_Report_FINAL_XbLt4JnB, page 178 · Operation_Watts_Special_Report_FINAL_XbLt4JnB, page 191 · Operation_Watts_Special_Report_FINAL_XbLt4JnB, page 202 · Operation_Watts_Special_Report_FINAL_XbLt4JnB, page 203 · Operation_Watts_Special_Report_FINAL_XbLt4JnB, page 213
In the body's own words
- Finding
There was extensive misuse of staff for factional or party-specific purposes during business hours.
- Conclusion
We concluded that two MPs breached one or more elements of the Ministerial Code of Conduct and the MPs’ Code of Conduct.
- Finding
Factional members or their relatives were given publicly funded employment in electorate or ministerial offices as a reward for recruiting members or working for the faction.
- Conclusion
It has not been possible to determine the extent of factional work done during office hours during the period under investigation, but it undoubtedly involved a very substantial misuse of public resources.
- Finding
Despite the allegations that were, in part, the reason for establishing Operation Watts, no evidence was uncovered that such grants were used to pay for ALP memberships.
Findings, opinions and statements
Allegations are not findings. A commission's finding or opinion of corrupt conduct or misconduct is not a finding that a person is guilty of a criminal offence, and the commissions say so in their reports.
No findings are reproduced in this record. This does not establish that the report contains none.
Recommendations 21
Recommendation 1
That: (a) the government and the parliament work together to establish a Parliamentary Ethics Committee that would: (i) monitor the effectiveness of the Statement of Values and Code of Conduct in the Members of Parliament (Standards) Act 1978 and other ethical obligations imposed on MPs (ii) promote and provide training and information about the Statement of Values and Code of Conduct, in the parliament and in the general community (iii) prepare guidance materials on the Statement of Values and Code of Conduct (iv) work with the Parliamentary Integrity Commissioner in carrying out its functions and receiving reports about ethical standards (v) review the Statement of Values and Code of Conduct at least once every four years. (b) the Parliamentary Ethics Committee should be a Joint House Committee composed of equal numbers of members from the Legislative Assembly and Legislative Council and be established by amendment to the Parliamentary Committees Act 2003. Consideration should be given to including some members from each of the parliamentary privileges committees. (c) the government and parliament should consider for inclusion in the Parliamentary Ethics Committee’s role and composition: • a requirement to consult the public when undertaking reviews • a power to appoint members of the public to assist it with its work, or specify a fixed number of members of the public to be Committee members • appointment of a non-government member as the chair of the Committee • a power for the Committee to undertake related integrity roles as may be requested, such as in relation to codes of conduct for ministers, ministerial advisors and electorate officers, or a parliamentary bullying and harassment protocol.
Recommendation 2
That: (a) the government and the parliament work together to establish a Parliamentary Integrity Commissioner as an independent officer of the parliament who would: (i) receive and investigate complaints about possible non-criminal breaches of the Members of Parliament Code of Conduct in the Members of Parliament (Standards) Act 1978 and other standards and rules relevant to parliamentary integrity (ii) submit reports on investigations to the privileges committee of the relevant House for consideration and action where required, including recommendations on appropriate sanctions for a serious breach of the Members of Parliament Code of Conduct or other integrity rule or standard (iii) monitor the effectiveness of the Statement of Values and Code of Conduct in the Members of Parliament (Standards) Act 1978 and other ethical obligations imposed on members of parliament (iv) promote and provide training and information about the Statement of Values and Code of Conduct, in the parliament and the general community, in collaboration with the Parliamentary Ethics Committee (v) help the Parliamentary Ethics Committee prepare guidance materials on the Statement of Values and Code of Conduct and review the Statement of Values and Code of Conduct at least once every four years (vi) undertake other integrity-related functions allocated to them by the government or parliament. (b) the Parliamentary Integrity Commissioner be established by legislation and be appointed by or upon the recommendation of a cross-party parliamentary panel with members from both Houses selected for that purpose (c) the term of appointment be for more than four years and that there be narrowly defined criteria for dismissal upon a recommendation from the proposed Parliamentary Ethics Committee (d) the processes and sanctions available to the Parliamentary Integrity Commissioner be fair, efficient and proportionate to the nature of the alleged breach (e) the Parliamentary Integrity Commissioner have the powers and resources necessary to carry out their functions, including a power to apply sanctions by consent where a member of parliament acknowledges a breach of a minor nature, such as requiring an apology or a binding undertaking.
Recommendation 3
That: (a) the privileges committees of each House be reformed to dilute the capacity of the majority in each House to determine the privileges committees’ priorities and decision making (b) the privileges committee for the relevant House should receive the report of a Parliamentary Integrity Commissioner’s investigation, provide the relevant MP with an opportunity to respond to it, and table the report in the House together with the privileges committee’s comments and recommendations, within a fixed time of receiving the report (c) if the privileges committee disagrees with all or some of the Parliamentary Integrity Commissioner’s recommendations, it must provide a comprehensive explanation of its reasons when tabling the Parliamentary Integrity Commissioner’s report (d) the relevant House should vote within a fixed time of the tabling of the Parliamentary Integrity Commissioner’s report to support or reject all or some of the Parliamentary Integrity Commissioner’s or privileges committee’s recommendations, but should not be permitted to amend them.
Recommendation 4
That the Parliamentary Integrity Adviser continue to provide confidential advice to members of parliament on integrity and ethical issues and help the Parliamentary Integrity Commissioner and Parliamentary Ethics Committee with information and training activities.
Recommendation 5
That whichever party or parties form government after the November 2022 state election commit to introducing and commencing the legislation to establish the Parliamentary Ethics Committee and Parliamentary Integrity Commissioner as recommended in this report, by June 2024.
Recommendation 6
That the work of the Parliamentary Ethics Committee and Parliamentary Integrity Commissioner to promote an ethical culture in parliament: (a) involve and be actively supported by the leaders of all political parties represented in the parliament, as well as by the presiding officers (b) focus closely on the role of leadership in fostering ethical practices (c) reinforce respect and support for the institution of parliament (d) create strong links with the community and community groups.
Recommendation 7
That the definition of prohibited party-specific activities in section 30 of the Parliamentary Administration Act 2005 be amended to include activities undertaken for the predominant purpose of helping the administration, organisation or management of a political party, including the recruitment and maintenance of party members.
Recommendation 8
That: a) an offence be created that provides that a member of parliament who directs or allows a person to undertake party-specific activities while that person is employed to help the member of parliament discharge their public duties is guilty of an offence. b) the government in formulating the offence and the penalty should take account of: • the degree of a member of parliament’s intent or recklessness in directing or allowing the employee to undertake such activities • activities where it is difficult to separate the party-political aspect of the work from the normal duties of an electorate officer’s role, such as attendance at a community-organised event with the member of parliament • unavoidable and reasonable communication with a party’s head office or local branch on minor or incidental matters.
Recommendation 9
That: a) the proposed Parliamentary Ethics Committee and Parliamentary Integrity Commissioner review the Electorate Officers Code of Conduct, to make it more relevant to the actual responsibilities of the electorate officer role and to explicitly prohibit party-specific work from being undertaken during an electorate officer’s employment b) the Code of Conduct be publicly available.
Recommendation 10
That: a) members of parliament be prohibited from employing close family members in their electorate office b) the government and parliament consider whether this prohibition should extend to a member of parliament employing a close family member of another member of parliament from the same political party.
Recommendation 11
That, to strengthen the capacity of the Department of Parliamentary Services to perform its role efficiently and effectively: a) the Secretary of the Department of Parliamentary Services be the employer of electorate office staff in their capacity as Secretary of Department of Parliamentary Services, not as a delegate of the presiding officers b) the contractual term for the Secretary of the Department of Parliamentary Services be made significantly longer than the duration of a parliamentary term.
Recommendation 12
That the presiding officers and the Department of Parliamentary Services review the processes for recruiting and selecting electorate office staff, to promote a more competitive, open and merit-based process. Possible topics for the review include: a) reviewing the standard position description for electorate officers, and including an explicit statement prohibiting the successful applicant from engaging in party-specific activities b) requiring all non-casual roles to be advertised by the Department of Parliamentary Services. The Department of Parliamentary Services would receive all applications and forward them to the member of parliament. The desirable level of involvement by the Department of Parliamentary Services in helping a member of parliament appoint an electorate officer could be considered, for example, in respect of whether a departmental employee should sit on a selection panel, either in all cases or upon request c) requiring a member of parliament, when nominating an applicant for a job as an electorate officer, to provide the Department of Parliamentary Services with a selection report demonstrating the suitability and preferability of the successful applicant compared with other applicants and advising the Department of Parliamentary Services of the reasons for employing a casual electorate officer.
Recommendation 13
That: (a) the presiding officers and the Department of Parliamentary Services review the arrangements for managing and supervising electorate officers, to ensure that: (i) electorate officers’ work is undertaken within the limits of their role (ii) electorate officers are competently and effectively supervised (iii) electorate officers receive all the legal protections that they are entitled to (iv) electorate officers are given learning and development opportunities to develop their skills (b) the Department of Parliamentary Services take a more active role in implementing the new arrangements described in (a).
Recommendation 14
That the presiding officers, the Department of Parliamentary Services and the Department of Parliamentary Services Audit Committee review the Department of Parliamentary Services audit program in light of this investigation’s findings, to refine their approach to risk identification and the choice of issues and business operations that should be audited.
Recommendation 15
That section 17 of the Public Interests Disclosures Act 2012 be reviewed to open up an alternative course for a person who has reasonable grounds for not wishing to lodge a complaint with a presiding officer.
Recommendation 16
That the Ministerial Code of Conduct be amended to clarify that ministers must ensure that the public resources made available for performing their duties are not used for party-specific purposes.
Recommendation 17
That the government and parliament clarify the extent to which it is intended that the Members of Parliament Code of Conduct and the processes for dealing with breaches of the Code should cover the actions of ministers in relation to their ministerial portfolios. 989. The definition of ‘public duties’ in the Members of Parliament Code of Conduct includes ‘ministerial business’.164 It is unclear whether it was really intended that a breach of the Members of Parliament Code of Conduct by a minister while performing their ministerial duties (for instance, misuse of ministerial staff) could be referred under the MP(S) Act by a presiding officer to the relevant privileges committee for investigation as well as potentially being the subject of an investigation by the Premier (or their appointed investigator) for breaches of the Ministerial Code of Conduct.
Recommendation 18
That: a) an offence be created that provides that a minister who directs or allows a person to undertake party-specific activities while that person is employed to assist the minister in discharging their public duties is guilty of an offence b) the government, in formulating the offence and the penalty, should take account of: • the degree of a minister’s intent or recklessness in directing or allowing the employee to undertake such activities • activities where it is difficult to separate the party-political aspect of the work from the normal duties of a ministerial staff member’s role, such as briefing other members of parliament and party members on matters relevant to the minister’s portfolio • unavoidable and reasonable communication with a party’s head office or local branch on minor or incidental matters.
Recommendation 19
That: a) the Ministerial Staff Code of Conduct be reviewed to explicitly prohibit party specific work from being undertaken during the course of a ministerial staff member’s employment b) the Ministerial Staff Code of Conduct be made publicly available.
Recommendation 20
That the Victorian Government: a) undertake a comprehensive review of existing conflict-of-interest controls for ministers and ministerial staff to strengthen the identification and management of conflict of interest b) make appropriate revisions to the codes of conduct for ministers and ministerial staff to recognise the particular risks of conflicts of interest c) develop associated guidance to raise awareness of the risks associated with unmanaged conflicts of interest, and provide mandatory training for ministers and ministerial staff.
Recommendation 21
That state and local government funders of community organisations continue to improve their policies and processes to manage grants, in accordance with evolving best practice, and make sure that monitoring and reporting practices are risk-informed and sufficiently prioritised to be implemented effectively. In particular, they should consider: a) requiring copies of receipts with all expenditure acquittals, and checking them against grant applications b) requiring payment of salaries to be accounted for, especially if existing office holders are being funded from non-recurring grant monies c) vetting applicant organisations’ competence to undertake specific-purpose projects d) requiring grant recipients to certify that items of expenditure have not been claimed against other organisational revenues or grants, to prevent the use of the same receipt to acquit different reporting obligations to different grant providers e) adopting proactive risk-management practices to identify organisations that might have weak accountability arrangements f) withholding final grant payments or refusing to accept new grant applications from an applicant who has not completed a full grant acquittal report.
Published responses 1
Operation Watts Progress report, September 2023
Parliament of Victoria tabled documents database, tabled paper 7462
- Publisher
- Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission and Ombudsman
Notes on this record
- A joint report of IBAC and the Victorian Ombudsman.
- Tabled: Legislative Assembly 2022-08-02; Legislative Council 2022-08-02.
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