Investigation into the awarding of contracts by employees of the former NSW roads and maritime services (Operation Ember)
- Findings
- 4
- Recommendations
- 7
- Published responses
- 3
- Report length
- 192 pages
Summary
Generated summary: written by an AI model from the report text and checked against the cited pages.
For Operation Ember, NSW ICAC expressed the opinion that consideration should be given to seeking prosecution advice from the Director of Public Prosecutions.
Operation Ember recommendations for prosecutions (pdf), page 1
The Commission’s proposed prosecution advice covers fraud, public-office misconduct and corrupt benefits associated with roads agency contracts, invoices and tender processes.
Operation Ember recommendations for prosecutions (pdf), page 1 · Operation Ember recommendations for prosecutions (pdf), page 2 · Operation Ember recommendations for prosecutions (pdf), page 3 · Operation Ember recommendations for prosecutions (pdf), page 4
The Commission also proposed advice about false or misleading evidence concerning work reports, tender assistance and procurement of weighing equipment.
Operation Ember recommendations for prosecutions (pdf), page 1 · Operation Ember recommendations for prosecutions (pdf), page 2 · Operation Ember recommendations for prosecutions (pdf), page 3
The Commission states that the Director of Public Prosecutions decides whether charges can be laid and conducts prosecutions.
Operation Ember recommendations for prosecutions (pdf), page 1
Findings 4
Allegations are not findings. A commission's finding or opinion of corrupt conduct or misconduct is not a finding that a person is guilty of a criminal offence, and the commissions say so in their reports.
serious corrupt conduct
FindingThe Commission found that Mr Soliman engaged in serious corrupt conduct by:
serious corrupt conduct
FindingThe Commission found that Mr Thammiah engaged in serious corrupt conduct by:
serious corrupt conduct
FindingThe Commission found that Mr Hamidi engaged in serious corrupt conduct by: • between 7 February 2017 and 17 September 2018, submitting invoices for the: – January 2017 contract for a scoping study and trial of the IMC thermal camera, for which AZH was paid $31,900 by RMS – January 2017 contract for a field trial and scoping study of the SICK dimension scanner, for which AZH was paid $31,900 by RMS – January 2017 contract for a field trial and scoping study for the TIRTL and Optris thermal scanner, for which AZH was paid $33,000 by RMS – January 2017 contract for a field trial and scoping study for the TIRTL and LTI dimension scanner, for which AZH was paid $33,000 by RMS – January 2017 contract for a field trial and scoping study for integration of the TIRTL and WIM, for which AZH was paid $30,800 by RMS – April 2017 contract for trial and scoping study for Houston Radar technology, for which AZH was paid $33,000 by RMS – April 2017 contract for a two-phase report on heavy vehicle crash analysis, for which AZH was paid $66,000 by RMS – May 2017 contract for field trials and scoping study for thermal and cold cameras, for which AZH was paid $99,000 by RMS – July 2017 contract for trial of HAENNI portable scales, for which AZH was paid $53,625 by RMS – August 2017 contract for trial of PAT 10C III portable scales, for which AZH was paid $53,625 by RMS – December 2017 contract for trial and study of modern portable scales, for which AZH was paid $241,175 by RMS – March 2018 contract for in-ground thermal camera trial and study, for which AZH was paid $179,259 by RMS – June 2018 contract for modernising ITS field trials and study, for which AZH was paid $230,890 by RMS – August 2018 contract for trial and study of heavy vehicle avoidance, for which AZH was paid $195,690 by RMS in each case knowing when he did so, that he had not done, or would not do, most of the work for which he invoiced and that Mr Soliman would use his position at the RMS to dishonestly arrange for payment of the invoices (chapters 5, 6 and 7) • on 25 October 2017, in agreement with Mr Soliman, lodging a tender submission with RMS for inclusion on the PSC panel, knowing that Mr Soliman had drafted AZH’s submission and that he had used, and would continue to use, his position to favour AZH’s appointment to the PSC panel (chapters 6 and 7) • between 4 June 2017 and 9 August 2018, paying Mr Soliman $177,450 in 13 payments as an inducement or reward for Mr Soliman exercising his official functions to favour AZH and award the company multiple RMS contracts (chapter 7).
serious corrupt conduct
FindingThe Commission found that Mr Singh engaged in serious corrupt conduct by: • in October 2017, improperly assisting AZH to be appointed to the PSC panel by recommending AZH’s appointment, knowing that its tender submission contained false and misleading information about the experience and technical skill of AZH and Mr Hamidi, and deliberately failing to declare his conflict of interest arising from his friendship with Mr Hamidi (chapters 6 and 7) • between February and March 2018, partially and dishonestly exercising his official functions by recommending Novation as the winning tenderer for a contract valued at over $2 million and declaring that he was not aware of any situation that might lead to an actual or perceived conflict of interest, or which might affect him carrying out his functions both fairly and in RMS’s best interest, when he knew that the friendship between Mr Soliman and Mr Thammiah was such a situation (chapter 11).
Recommendations 7
Recommendation 1
That Transport for NSW (TfNSW) updates and reissues its online training and other awareness-raising products relating to conflicts of interest, fraud and corruption prevention and procurement. TfNSW should also consider delivering customised training to staff who manage high-risk programs and budgets.
Recommendation 2
That TfNSW: reviews all supplier panels created or used by the former Compliance and Regulatory Services (CaRS) Division (that remain in existence) with a view to assessing compliance with past and current procurement policy, any undisclosed conflicts of interest or similarities with the conduct identified in this investigation considers mandating additional oversight or involvement by agency procurement experts in the formation and maintenance of all TfNSW supplier panels.
Recommendation 3
That TfNSW considers requiring use of a secure, electronic system for seeking quotations from suppliers. The system should prevent staff from opening RFQ responses before the due date.
Recommendation 4
That TfNSW revises its supplier due diligence procedures. This could include but not be limited to: enhancing the suite of checks that are performed by Transport Shared Services when adding new suppliers to the vendor master file identifying new suppliers that may not have the necessary credentials, capability or experience strengthening procedures for conducting referee checks.
Recommendation 5
That TfNSW develops a data analytics program aimed at detecting suspicious conduct including but not necessarily limited to: order-splitting recently registered suppliers or suppliers that are not registered for GST consecutively numbered invoices misuse of delegations POs associated with budgets not controlled by the approver goods and services that are receipted shortly after the PO has been raised.
Recommendation 6
That TfNSW develops a register of heavy vehicle enforcement assets. This register should be used as the basis for future procurement strategies and decisions to replace or maintain assets.
Recommendation 7
That TfNSW performs a “lessons learnt” exercise or audit based on the findings from this investigation. This could include an examination of: whether the weaknesses identified in the HVP Unit exist elsewhere in TfNSW business units that lack adequate supervision procurement governance and reporting the need for a new corruption risk assessment substantial procurements that proceeded without a procurement strategy whether the scope of responsibility and resourcing of the procurement advisory function is sufficient whether the devolved procurement framework provides sufficient assurance regarding value for money and compliance.
Published responses 3
Official documents 2
Investigation into the awarding of contracts by employees of the former NSW roads and maritime services (Operation Ember)
Document details
- Role
- Report
Operation Ember recommendations for prosecutions (pdf)
Document details
- Role
- Recommendations
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