Investigation into the over payment of public funds by the university of sydney for security services (Operation Gerda)

Findings 7

Allegations are not findings. A commission's finding or opinion of corrupt conduct or misconduct is not a finding that a person is guilty of a criminal offence, and the commissions say so in their reports.

1. serious corrupt conduct

   Finding

   The Commission is satisfied that Emir Balicevac, an SNP employee, engaged in serious corrupt conduct in that his conduct impaired or could impair public confidence in public administration and could also involve obtaining or assisting in obtaining, or dishonestly benefiting from, payment of public funds for private advantage.

   Report, page 8, Summary of investigation and outcomes

2. serious corrupt conduct

   Finding

   The Commission is also satisfied that Mr Balicevac engaged in serious corrupt conduct in that his conduct involved conduct that adversely affects, or could adversely affect, either directly or indirectly, the honest or impartial exercise of official functions by a public official.

   Report, page 8, Summary of investigation and outcomes

3. serious corrupt conduct

   Finding

   The Commission is satisfied that Daryl McCreadie, also an SNP employee, engaged in serious corrupt conduct in that his conduct impaired or could impair public confidence in public administration and could also involve obtaining or assisting in obtaining, or dishonestly benefiting from, payment of public funds for private advantage.

   Report, page 8, Summary of investigation and outcomes

4. serious corrupt conduct

   Finding

   The Commission is satisfied that George Boutros, an SIG security guard, engaged in serious corrupt conduct in that his conduct impaired or could impair public confidence in public administration and could also involve obtaining or assisting in obtaining, or dishonestly benefiting from, payment of public funds for private advantage.

   Report, page 9, Summary of investigation and outcomes

5. serious corrupt conduct

   Finding

   The Commission is satisfied that Taher Sirour, the director and CEO of SIG, engaged in serious corrupt conduct in that his conduct impaired or could impair public confidence in public administration and could also involve obtaining or assisting in obtaining, or dishonestly benefiting from, payment of public funds for private advantage.

   Report, page 9, Summary of investigation and outcomes

6. serious corrupt conduct

   Finding

   The Commission is also satisfied that Mr Sirour engaged in serious corrupt conduct in that his conduct involved conduct that adversely affects, or could adversely affect, either directly or indirectly, the honest or impartial exercise of official functions by a public official.

   Report, page 9, Summary of investigation and outcomes

7. serious corrupt conduct

   Finding

   The Commission is satisfied that Mr Smith engaged in serious corrupt conduct in that his conduct involved conduct that adversely affects, or could adversely affect, either directly or indirectly, the honest or impartial exercise of his official functions.

   Report, page 9, Summary of investigation and outcomes

Recommendations 24

1. Recommendation 1

   That the University ensures that key tender documentation, such as procurement strategies, tender evaluation plans and tender evaluation committee (TEC) reports, include a realistic and detailed assessment of procurement and contract risks. This assessment should be conducted in a manner that incorporates operational risks and complies with the risk management principles in the International Standard on Risk Management ISO 31000:2018.

   Report, page 9

2. Recommendation 2

   That the University amends its Guidelines for using the risk assessment tool to provide more detailed guidance on major contract risks.

   Report, page 9

3. Recommendation 3

   That the University assesses contract assurance frameworks that cover key risks involved in the provision of services, such as a reliance on subcontracting, when assessing the capability and capacity of tenderers.

   Report, page 9

4. Recommendation 4

   That the chief procurement officer formally reviews requests for tender (RFTs) for high-risk tenders and tender evaluation plans for significant procurement undertakings.

   Report, page 9

5. Recommendation 5

   That the University should review its tender assessment criteria and weightings to avoid perceptions that unwarranted advantages are provided to a particular tenderer.

   Report, page 9

6. Recommendation 6

   That probity walls and/or other safeguards should be established where there is a risk that someone connected to a tenderer could access confidential information about a tender process and tenderers’ submissions.

   Report, page 9

7. Recommendation 7

   That the University should ensure consistency across its tender documentation concerning how tenders will be evaluated.

   Report, page 10

8. Recommendation 8

   That the University should continue to assess all tenderers and, where relevant, their supply chains to ensure compliance with Awards.

   Report, page 10

9. Recommendation 9

   That all TEC chairs and/or appointed probity advisers should ensure that tender scoring methodologies are clear to evaluators and that the tender assessment criteria have been followed.

   Report, page 10

10. Recommendation 10

    That tender reports to the Finance and Audit Committee (FAC) and the tender board should contain adequate information to enable key issues to be understood. The information should include: tenders’ assessment criteria scores key contract risks and their mitigation key assumptions any significant probity concerns and the manner in which they were resolved.

    University of Sydney - allegations concerning contract security suppliers (Operation Gerda), Recommendations for corruption prevention

11. Recommendation 11

    That the University should ensure all future contracts for the provision of security services include adequate provisions covering: subcontracting terms contractor assurance frameworks right-to-audit clauses timesheet access technology requirements.

    University of Sydney - allegations concerning contract security suppliers (Operation Gerda), Recommendations for corruption prevention

12. Recommendation 12

    That security contractors should be required to provide evidence that they have properly implemented internal controls to ensure that security staff (including subcontractors) have completed their duties in accordance with the contract and work orders.

    Report, page 10

13. Recommendation 13

    That the University should document its internal contractor controls. A report of the conduct of the controls, exceptions to the controls and the resolution of those exceptions should be given to relevant managers in CIS.

    Report, page 10

14. Recommendation 14

    That the University should perform random checks that security guards are on duty. These could include GPS monitoring, reviewing CCTV and access records, and surprise visits to certain locations.

    Report, page 10

15. Recommendation 15

    That there should be a regular rotation between at least two University employees who undertake contractor checks to ensure that security services are provided.

    Report, page 10

16. Recommendation 16

    That the University should have access to guard timesheets. The University should also inspect the timesheets to ensure compliance with legislative requirements and the contract, and to help confirm charges on invoices.

    Report, page 10

17. Recommendation 17

    That security contractors should be required to provide specimen signatures against which the signatures of guards should be checked.

    Report, page 10

18. Recommendation 18

    That the University should have key performance indicators (KPIs) in place that cover the essential requirements for the provision of security services. It should also ensure KPI monitoring for security contracts is based on data that is trustworthy, measurable and relevant, and that reliance on contractor self-reporting is minimalised.

    Report, page 10

19. Recommendation 19

    That the University should develop controls to identify when contract variations exceed 10% of the original contract amount. It should also clarify that a sufficiently senior delegate is required to scrutinise and approve cumulative ad hoc contract payments that exceed 10% of the contract value.

    Report, page 10

20. Recommendation 20

    That the University considers sharing some contract management duties between internal staff, who are co-located with security contractors, and staff, who do not have day-to-day contact with security contractors.

    Report, page 10

21. Recommendation 21

    That the University should develop a code of business practice or similar document and contractually bind major suppliers to comply with it. The document should include: a prohibition on suppliers or potential suppliers offering gifts and benefits a prohibition on actions that place University staff or other individuals in the supply chain in conflict of interest situations a requirement for suppliers to have comparable provisions in contracts with subcontractors or other companies in the supply chain details of where people can make reports (including anonymous reports) of breaches of the code of business practice.

    University of Sydney - allegations concerning contract security suppliers (Operation Gerda), Recommendations for corruption prevention

22. Recommendation 22

    That the University should establish a clear mechanism, and one that is clearly communicated, for the staff of suppliers and subcontractors to report corrupt conduct.

    Report, page 11

23. Recommendation 23

    That the University adopts a fraud and corruption control plan that appropriately addresses the risks of fraud and corruption. Among other things, the plan should reflect the findings made in previous Commission investigation reports concerning universities and ensure that the corruption prevention issues are not dealt with in isolation, but that the cumulative implications are properly considered.

    Report, page 11

24. Recommendation 24

    That all internal audit reports should be given to the director of internal audit and reported to the FAC. The internal audits should be reviewed by an internal audit manager to assess the implications of the report and whether there are red flags of possible fraud and corruption. If necessary, internal auditors’ working papers should also be obtained.

    Report, page 11

Published responses 2

• 12 month progress report - University of Sydney

  Progress report

• Plan of Action - University of Sydney

  Action plan

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